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ABSTRACT 
 
The commercial property market in New Zealand is characterized by two standard but 
distinct lease environments. In Auckland, the commercial core of the economy, net 
leases dominate, whereas in Wellington, the political capital, gross leases are 
dominant. These different lease environments have the potential to strongly influence 
the nature of landlord and tenant relationships in these markets. Using in-depth 
interviews with key industry personnel, this study examines the perceptions, 
behaviours, experiences and key issues confronting landlords and tenants under net 
and gross leases. The paper examines how different lease structures affect the 
behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of landlords and tenants including: 
landlord/tenant perceptions of a lease, the operation and maintenance procedures, 
landlord-tenant relationship, and ultimately, overall satisfaction. 
 
Keywords: alternative lease structures, property management, landlord tenant 
behaviours, landlord-tenant relationship. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to improve business success, landlords are now looking to place more 
emphasis in maintaining positive relationships with their tenants. This has become 
particularly apparent in an economic climate where tenants have increased negotiating 
power (French and Jones, 2010; Rasila, 2010). However, there is evidence that this 
change to leasing practice is primarily only adopted by more insightful landlords and 
overall the requirements of tenants are not generally fully understood or provided for 
by landlords (French and Jones, 2010). The structure of commercial leases, 
specifically, has been identified as exacerbating this mismatch between tenants’ lease 
requirements and lease clauses (Crosby et al., 2003).    
Theoretically, leases should be responsive to the requirements of both landlords and 
tenants, and with each agreement the interests of both parties should be enhanced 
Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol 17, No 4, 2011                                                                      
              
561 
(Jaffe and Yang, 1997). However, there is a growing literature that suggests that many 
landlords attempt to enforce strongly pro-landlord lease forms by being largely 
inflexible towards tenant lease requirements (Crosby et al., 2003; Crosby et al., 2006; 
Dunn, 2003; Edward and Krendel, 2007; French and Jones, 2010; Lizieri et al., 1997). 
Such lease contracts cause discontent among tenants and have long term negative 
effects that are detrimental to good landlord-tenant relationships and well-performing 
leases (Goldman, 2000b; Harris, 2004; Rothenberg and Ruddy, 2004; Saltz, 1990). In 
the UK, occupier satisfaction surveys (Kingsley Lipsey Morgan and IPD, 2007; 
Property Industry Alliance and CoreNet Global 2010) confirm a high level of 
frustration among tenants with the service provided to them by their landlords. The 
behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of landlords and tenants could have a 
significant impact on the operation of a lease, the strength of the landlord-tenant 
relationship, overall satisfaction and, ultimately, profitability for the landlord.  
 
Recognising the significance of the behaviour of key market agents in the 
determination of market operations, property research in recent years has sought to 
understand the impact of human behaviours in property processes (Baum et al., 2000; 
Daly et al., 2003; Diaz, 2000; Diaz III, 1999; Hardin III, 1999; Leishman and 
Watkins, 2004; Levy and Henry 2003; Levy, 2005; Roberts and Henneberry, 2007). 
Although in recent times there has been increased diversity in the behavioural real 
estate literature, the work in this area has tended to focus on appraisal issues (Diaz III, 
1999; Pfrang and Wittig, 2008; Roberts and Henneberry, 2007). Despite the growing 
diversity in lease structures, there is currently limited empirical research on 
understanding how landlords and tenants behave under different lease environments 
and the effect of leases on the evolution of landlord-tenant relationships and their 
overall experience with the lease.   
 
As part of a wider study exploring the operation of alternative lease structures, this 
paper seeks to increase this understanding by investigating the perceptions, behaviours 
and experiences of landlords and tenants in the context of two most commonly used 
lease structures in the New Zealand market: gross and net leases. The study focuses on 
two distinct New Zealand office leasing markets; Auckland dominated by net leases 
and Wellington by gross leases. Using key informant interviews, the paper examines 
the experiences of a set of landlords that manage a total of over 875,000 sqm (9.4 
million sq feet) of commercial space located in New Zealand worth in excess of NZ$4 
billon, and tenants (both public and private) that lease in excess of 300 New Zealand 
office locations. In particular, the following research questions are addressed: 
 
• How do landlords and tenants perceive alternative lease structures and the 
ability of these leases to meet their lease requirements?  
• Are there any differences in landlord and tenant leasing behaviours and 
experiences under different leases? 
• What issues, if any, do they associate with alternative leases?    
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The remainder of the paper is in four parts. The next section provides an overview of 
the study and reviews the existing literature that highlights the importance of 
acquiring an in-depth understanding of the impact of different lease structures on 
landlord-tenant leasing behaviours. Section two outlines the research methodology 
and this is followed by the main findings of the study. The concluding section 
highlights the key findings of the research and comments of the implications of these 
findings for commercial leasing practice. 
 
CONTEXT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Traditionally within New Zealand, the office markets located in the two major urban 
centres of Auckland and Wellington have adopted alternative lease structures 
(Halvitigala et al., 2011). Auckland, the country’s commercial capital and largest 
metropolitan area comprising over 1.62 million sqm of space (Colliers International, 
2010) is strongly driven by the service sector which occupies 60% of the total space 
(Jones Lang LaSalle, 2005). The Auckland office market is characterised by net leases 
and is strongly influenced by the presence of institutional investors and corporate 
tenants. Wellington, which operates as the centre of the government sector, is the 
second largest office market with a total office stock of approximately 1.46 million 
sqm (Bayleys, 2010). The Wellington office market where 40% of the office space is 
occupied by public sector tenants (CBRE, 2008) is dominated by gross leases. In 
addition, leases in New Zealand are relatively standard in structure and tend to follow 
one of two distinct formats, the Auckland District Law Society lease, and the Building 
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) lease. Given these characteristics, New 
Zealand offers a significant empirical context for this research. 
 
The major difference between a gross and net lease revolves around the responsibility 
for the payment of operating expenses (OPEX) (Mooradian and Yang, 2002; 
Rowland, 2002). Under a gross lease, the landlord pays for OPEX without a separate 
charge to the tenant (Rowland, 1996). A net lease requires the tenant to pay all, or a 
portion of a property’s OPEX in addition to the agreed rent (Bierschenk et al., 1999). 
Both landlords and tenants commonly prefer not to take responsibility for OPEX due 
to the risk of cost escalations affecting the bottom line (Adamshick, 1995; Rowland, 
2000). Therefore, negotiations around landlords’ and tenants’ OPEX responsibilities 
can be a complex process (Crosby and Murdoch, 1998 as cited in Noor and Pitt, 
2009). Rowland (2000) argues that it is not uncommon for landlords or tenants to 
surrender part of the rent if the other party accepts responsibility for these outgoings.  
 
Many landlords have a strong preference for net leases as they guarantee a constant, 
predictable long term income stream (Edward and Krendel, 2007; Mattson-Teig, 
2000; Rowland, 2002; Rowland, 1996). The benefits of net leases from the tenant’s 
perspective are mainly related to their ability to control the operation procedures of 
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the building since they too are directly contributing to the running costs (Rowland, 
1994). However, several studies have identified that many tenants are unhappy with 
the quality of services that are delivered by landlords and the service charges that are 
levied to them under net leases (Cooke, 2007 as cited in Noor and Pitt, 2009; Edward 
and Krendel, 2007; Noor et al., 2010, Silman, 2007). Net lease tenants often suspect 
that landlords overspend or manage the OPEX carelessly since they control the nature 
and the extent of the expenses while tenants have to pay (Edward and Krendel, 2007; 
Goldman, 2000a; Lewison, 1999; Noor et al., 2010; Rowland, 2002; Silman, 2007). 
OPEX charges are solely governed by the lease contract without any legislation (Noor 
and Pitt, 2009; Silman, 2007) and the absence of any legislative instrument causes 
dissatisfaction among tenants (Noor et al., 2010). In fact, The Loughborough Report 
(2009), based on the UK market, found that service charges in commercial buildings 
were higher than necessary and many tenants were frustrated by a feeling of not being 
able to influence service charge costs (Calvert, 2009). As a result, RICS Code of 
Practice (2011) strongly encourages a continual communication between landlords 
and tenants where tenants can have an opportunity to challenge all services 
procurement and expenses.  
 
The most significant issue with gross leases for landlords is the risk and uncertainty 
associated with the net return as their investment return can be eroded by OPEX 
escalations which are sometimes neither within their control nor of direct benefit to 
them (Wyldbore-Smith, 1990). However, landlord provision of services may mitigate 
contracting problems and reduce negative interactions and relationships among 
tenants in multi-tenant properties (Mooradian and Yang, 2002). The certainty 
associated with the total occupancy costs is of paramount importance to tenants under 
gross leases (Rowland, 1996). This is particularly advantageous for tenants who 
occupy premises with high maintenance costs (Mooradian and Yang, 2002). However, 
there may be an element of under-maintenance under gross leases in order to protect 
the landlord’s net return (Rowland, 1994).  
 
Due to the importance of commercial rents in determining the investment value of 
properties, the extant literature relating to property leasing has mainly been directed 
towards examining the financial characteristics of leases and the effect of different 
lease covenants on investment returns (Adair et al., 1994; Hamilton et al., 2006; 
Metawa, 1995; Turner and Thomas, 2001a; Turner and Thomas, 2001b). However, 
Ball et al. (1998) suggest that market agents’ behaviours may differ from those 
implied by rational profit-maximization and these differences are influenced by the 
nature of the agents and their practices. The recent literature therefore has 
acknowledged the importance of examining the interactions of market agents, as “the 
essence of property is human behaviour” (Diaz III, 1999) and viewing property 
markets as the product of the market participants that operate within them (Baum et 
al., 2000).  
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The nature of the interaction between landlords and tenants is mediated by the 
provisions of their lease. However, landlords’ and tenants’ different lease objectives 
can cause tension between the two parties. Landlords have financial objectives 
regarding the cash flow qualities and capital values of their investment and this gives 
them a different perspective from tenants, who require space to run their businesses 
(Crosby et al., 2006). Previous studies have provided insights into tenants’ 
dissatisfaction with their leases, as many landlords do not make commercial property 
available on the terms sought by tenants (Crosby et al., 2003; French and Jones, 2010; 
RICS, 2005)  
 
The review of the existing literature, although highlighting a number advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative leases from the landlord and tenant perspectives, fails to 
provide an in-depth understanding of the impact of the lease structure on their 
relationship and resultant behaviours. Research relating to lease structures has tended 
to focus on the effects of economic factors on the financial return of a property 
investment. Given the potential impact of the way the lease is structured, it is 
important to understand landlords’ and tenants’ behaviours, experiences and the key 
issues confronting them under different lease environments.  
  
METHODOLOGY 
 
The focus of this study is to explore and gain an in-depth understanding as to how 
landlords and tenants behave under alternative lease structures. In-depth key 
informant interviews with landlords and tenants were utilised as the most effective 
data collection method and the interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2009. Six 
commercial portfolio managers representing the three largest property trusts in New 
Zealand were interviewed. These managers  between them were responsible for the 
management of in excess of 875,000 sqm of commercial space (approximately 30% of 
the total office space in the Auckland and Wellington markets) worth in excess of 
NZ$4billion. In addition, eight of their major office tenants were interviewed who 
between them leased over 300 New Zealand office locations. Out of six landlords 
interviewed, four were commercial portfolio managers of the top three property trusts 
and the other two were commercial portfolio managers of two unlisted property funds 
managed by one of the top three listed property trusts. The property trusts represented 
in the interviews made up more than 75% of the total asset value of the commercial 
properties held by the New Zealand LPT sector in the year 2009 and 65% of their total 
value of all assets. The two unlisted property funds also owned commercial portfolios 
worth more than NZ$1 billion with approximately 334,000m2 of net lettable office 
space. All interviewees held the ultimate responsibility for leasing and other property 
related decisions for the entire property trust or their Auckland or Wellington 
portfolio. Details of the landlord interviewees are set out in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Profiles of the landlord interview participants 
Job title Value of the 
commercial 
  
 
Total NLA  
managed 
 
Type of commercial 
properties owned  
National 
Commercial 
   
856.17 170,968 Prime quality  
Wellington Portfolio 
Manager 
817.45 146,046 Prime quality  
Auckland Portfolio 
Manager 
751.50 106,889 Prime quality  
General Manager 390.00 117,810 Prime & secondary 
quality  
National Asset 
Manager 
540.44 144,028 Prime & secondary 
quality  
Asset Manager  650.13 190,598 Prime & secondary 
quality  
 
The eight tenants represented both the private and public sectors and were chosen on 
the basis of their business sector, geographical distribution, significance in the market, 
and the ability to provide meaningful insights into their leasing behaviours. Among 
the participants, three were large public sector tenants and of the five private sector 
tenants, two were large international tenants, two were large national tenants and one 
was a large New Zealand university. Approximately 75% of the participant 
organisations employed more than 1000 employees and occupied more than 50,000m2 
of space throughout the country. All interviewees held senior managerial level 
positions within their respective organizations and had extensive property 
management and commercial leasing experience. Details of the tenant interviewees 
are set out in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Profiles of the tenant interview participants 
Sector Job title Base of the 
organization 
No. of office locations 
in NZ 
Public National Property Manager  National  200 
Public Senior Property Advisor National  23 
Public Director, Corporate Services National  3  
Private Senior Property Manager  International   47  
Private General Manager, Property & 
Operations  
International  7  
Private Senior Property Manager National   22  
Private Corporate Manager  National  3  
University Property and Project Manager  National – 
Auckland 
based  
Cluster of office & 
educational properties 
in 4 locations 
 
Landlord interview questions were designed to elicit in-depth understanding of their 
perceptions of gross and net leases and their leasing behaviours, preferences, 
experiences, satisfaction and issues under the two lease types. While the topic areas 
contained in landlord and tenant interviews were reasonably similar, the specific 
questions reflected their different perspectives. For instance, landlords were asked: 
“How do you describe the operation and maintenance procedures of gross and net 
leased buildings in your portfolio?”, while tenants were asked: “How satisfied are you 
with the operation and maintenance procedures of the building you are occupying?”. 
Table 3 sets out the main topics examined in landlord and tenant interviews.   
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Table 3: Main topics examined in landlord and tenant interviews 
Landlord interviews Tenant interviews  
 Landlords’ preferred lease type vs. 
current lease types 
 Basis of determining the lease type to 
be offered 
 Tenants’ influence in lease 
negotiations 
 Advantages and disadvantages of 
gross and net leases 
 Financial performance of gross and 
net leases in terms of net return, risk 
and building capital values 
 OPEX sharing procedure and 
associated problems 
 Operation and maintenance 
procedures of gross and net leased 
buildings  
 Landlord-tenant relationship under 
alternative leases 
 Landlords’ overall satisfaction with 
gross and net lease structures 
 Tenants’ preferred lease type versus 
current lease types 
 Basis of determining their preferred 
lease type 
 Nature of influence in lease 
negotiations 
 Nature of influence in the operation 
of the lease 
 Advantages and disadvantages of 
gross and net leases 
 Tenant responsibility for OPEX, 
problems associated with them and 
their level of satisfaction 
 Satisfaction with the operation and 
maintenance procedure of leased 
premises 
 Nature of relationship with the 
landlord 
 Overall satisfaction with the lease  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
All interviews were audio-taped with the consent of the interviewees and transcribed. 
The transcripts were analysed using a thematic analysis, from which a number of 
themes emerged and these were categorised as follows: 
 
• Landlord and tenant perceptions towards gross and net leases  
• Financial implications of leases on investment returns 
• OPEX recovery process  
• Property operating and maintenance process  
• Landlord-tenant relationships 
 
Landlord and tenant perceptions towards gross and net leases 
Overall, landlords expressed a strong preference for triple net leases permitting them 
to recover all property running expenses from tenants. They perceived the net lease as 
a commercial imperative which aligned the objectives of landlords and tenants far 
more thoroughly in terms of maintaining landlords’ net return and providing a high 
level of service to tenants. They believed that net leases were conducive to reducing 
financial risk and uncertainty. They argued that the increased certainty protected them 
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from fluctuations associated with OPEX and thus made for more stable investment 
portfolios. The uncertainties associated with returns, and the difficulties in matching 
building services with tenants’ needs, were considered the most significant problems 
related to gross leases.  
 
Despite landlords’ strong preference for triple net leases, gross leases dominated their 
Wellington portfolios. The strong influence of public sector tenants in the Wellington 
market was the key factor preventing landlords from implementing their preferred 
form of net lease. Public sector tenants had a strong preference for gross leases mainly 
due to an aversion to cost uncertainties, a potential distrust of landlords’ OPEX 
management processes, and a reluctance to take responsibility for any property 
management activities. As one public sector tenant explained, “the simple 
fundamental is that we are not here to manage property, we just want to pay the rent 
and not have to worry about anything else” (Public Tenant 1).  
 
Larger tenants possess greater negotiating strength and access to information, 
resulting in them being more likely to negotiate lease structures that are more 
favourable compared to their smaller counterparts. The tenants interviewed noted that 
public sector tenants had, under the direction of the State Services Commission and 
Government Treasury, a coordinated approach to lease negotiations. This approach 
provides an ability to negotiate more tenant-favoured leases and to implement stronger 
protection mechanisms to ensure that landlords meet their lease obligations, 
particularly in the area of building maintenance. Conversely, the ability to control the 
operation and maintenance standards of the property, and the opportunity to be more 
involved in the management of properties, were identified as the main reasons 
corporate tenants prefer net leases. International tenants tended to express a stronger 
preference for net leases than national private sector tenants, which could be a result 
of their familiarity with net leases internationally. It was interesting to note that with 
the exception of one private sector tenant interviewee, no mention was made of the 
cost implications related to net leases. This suggests that large corporate tenants tend 
to be more concerned with the quality of their premises as opposed to their occupancy 
costs. To illustrate this, one international corporate tenant stated: “If you want to be a 
mean and miserly government tenant who worries about every dollar you spend - the 
gross lease is the best answer. To me net lease is the commercial reality, [for] 
proactive and informed people in business” (Private Tenant 1).   
 
The different perceptions of public and private sector tenants regarding alternative 
lease structures reflects the importance that large corporate tenants place on having 
high quality premises, whereas public sector tenants, being more financially 
constrained and less market driven, are more averse to cost uncertainty. The results 
from these interviews strongly suggest that tenant perceptions of alternative leases 
structures vary with expectations and priorities, financial constraints, willingness to 
take part in the management of the premises, previous lease experiences and trust in 
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the landlord. In contrast, landlords’ perceptions of lease structures are primarily 
focused on the financial returns.      
 
Financial implications of leases on investment returns 
Consistent with the views of the existing literature (Sirmans and Miller, 1997; Turner 
and Thomas, 2001a; Turner and Thomas, 2001b), all landlords interviewed 
emphasised that lease structures have the potential to significantly impact upon the 
delivery of property investment returns. When discussing leases in general, landlords 
strongly believed that due primarily to the uncertainty of OPEX,  properties subject to 
gross leases were more at risk of receiving lower, and more volatile, net returns than 
those on net leases. It was further stressed that the returns delivered by alternative 
leases could differ substantially if the landlords were small scale, unsophisticated, 
operating in isolation and with poor OPEX purchasing powers.  Landlords argued 
therefore that gross leases have the potential to add more uncertainties to the 
investment and thus have a significant negative impact on the net return and the 
property’s capital value.  
 
All landlords suggested however, that in their own portfolios there was no significant 
difference in the net return of their gross and net leased properties albeit their strong 
reservation regarding gross leases. As explained by one landlord: 
 
“Large property funds operate both gross and net leases in a similar way, so 
that puts away a lot of arguments about pros and cons of different leases. But for 
small, less sophisticated landlords with poor OPEX purchasing power, gross 
leased buildings will definitely be a poorer performer” (Landlord 1) 
 
All of the landlords interviewed maintained that their comprehensive management 
philosophies as large institutional investors, combined with their economies of scale, 
strong purchasing power over OPEX, carefully prepared budgeting exercises and long 
term contracts with service providers had significantly minimised the risk of OPEX 
price inflation. Notwithstanding their strong cost management practices, it was 
suggested that the impact of leases on return delivery depended on general inflation in 
the economy and the inflation in OPEX prices. Inflation would add to the uncertainty 
surrounding the net return of any gross leased property despite landlords efficient 
lease management procedures unless they had secured long term contracts with OPEX 
service providers.    
 
The interviews with tenants identified a significant discrepancy between the 
perceptions of public and private sector tenants on the effect of leases on landlords’ 
investment returns. Public sector tenants had a strong perception that landlords’ 
returns should not be affected whether the lease is a gross or net, as gross rentals 
should include a fair and reasonable figure going forward to cover uncertainties. 
Interestingly, they expressed strong criticism of the unsophisticated analyses 
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undertaken by some landlords and valuers (Halvitigala, et al., 2011) when determining 
rents under alternative leases. They commented that the gross rents set by some 
landlords were at a lower rate than they considered they should be, since landlords 
focussed only on the major OPEX items and other OPEX items are invariably 
undervalued or completely ignored. These comments raise questions regarding the 
ability of market participants to accurately ascertain the effect of lease obligations on 
rental levels.   
 
The majority of private sector tenants, in contrast to the public sector interviewees, 
suggested that the fixed rent under gross leases had a negative impact on landlords’ 
net return.  As explained by one private sector tenant;   
 
The return of a landlord with gross leases is degraded by the fact that he has a 
fixed income stream though he doesn’t have a fixed expense. So the end result is 
that the landlord with gross leases manages down their OPEX” (Private Tenant 
3).  
 
Overall, the perceptions of the landlords and tenants indicate that even though lease 
structures can have an impact on the delivery of investment returns, the direction and 
the size of this impact would mainly be determined by the size and sophistication of 
the landlord. In situations where landlords are large scale, with effective management 
strategies, properties on alternative lease structures generate reasonably similar net 
returns. Notwithstanding their preference for triple net leases, institutional landlords 
such as listed property trusts are therefore in a position to offer different lease types 
and minimise any negative impact associated with such leases.  
 
OPEX recovery procedures 
In order to examine if landlords and tenants experienced any issues when interpreting, 
calculating and allocating the OPEX under net leases, interviewees were asked to 
discuss their experience with the OPEX recovery process and the problems associated 
with it. The landlord interviews clearly indicated that major landlords recovered 
almost all property running costs from their tenants on net leases. All landlords 
interviewed believed that it was in the tenants’ best interest to pay for OPEX if they 
wanted to have an influence over the manner in which the building was operated. 
However, they were unlikely to consent to tenants taking responsibility for the OPEX 
management procedures, even in the circumstances where the tenant had a 
comparative cost advantage or expertise in building management. There was a strong 
desire, expressed by all of the landlords, to retain total control of the building 
management.   
 
Significantly, public and private sector tenants differed in their views relating to their 
responsibility for OPEX. There was a strong belief amongst public sector tenants that 
property management should be the responsibility of the landlord and thus they did 
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not wish to have any responsibility for OPEX.  Importantly, even though the private 
sector tenants were in favour of net leases, they were not totally in favour of landlords 
being in complete control of arranging service providers for the building. They 
indicated that the inability to arrange their own service providers had jeopardised their 
ability to match their required standard of work.   
 
Landlords emphasised that apart from some tenant enquiries to verify OPEX 
calculations at the end of OPEX reconciliations, there were no significant problems 
associated with the OPEX recovery process. As one landlord interviewed stated, “in 
OPEX wash-up time you might get 3 or 4 enquiries, but nothing of any real 
consequence” (Landlord 4). This result seems to contradict the findings of previous 
studies that suggest that the OPEX recovery process has the potential to create 
problems between landlords and tenants (Goldman, 2000a; Harris, 2004; Rothenberg 
and Ruddy, 2004). Landlords emphasised that the OPEX recovery process would only 
be problematic if the lease contract was vague or if landlords tried to overcharge or 
pass on illegitimate expenses onto tenants. They highlighted several procedures that 
they had implemented to minimise the opportunities for conflicts in the OPEX 
recovery process for their portfolios as illustrated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Steps taken by landlords to minimise the conflicts in OPEX recovery 
process 
Well interpreted and well documented lease contracts 
 
Proper negotiation of the landlord’s and tenants’ OPEX responsibilities at the start of 
the lease  
 
Meticulous approaches in interpreting, calculating, recording, allocating and 
implementing OPEX  
 
Accurate calculation of OPEX to ensure only legitimate costs are passed through 
 
As ethical landlords they do not make any profit from their OPEX  
 
Tenants are entitled to review landlords’ OPEX records and question or dispute the 
charges  
 
Punctuality when dealing with OPEX reconciliations  
 
In contrast, the majority of net lease tenants interviewed had experienced 
dissatisfaction regarding the allocation of OPEX. Three out of four net lease tenants 
believed that they were being overcharged, invoiced for items not legitimately 
considered as part of OPEX or experienced inefficiencies and delays associated with 
the OPEX reconciliation. As explained by two tenants:  
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“Our landlord would charge us for things we believe that should not be part of the 
OPEX” (Private Tenant 5)   
 
“Some of our landlords are slow, so you are dealing with OPEX calculations that 
are 2 (even 3) years out of date” (Private Tenant 4) 
 
All of the tenants indicated that large and/or strategically important tenants tended to 
have relatively less conflicts regarding the OPEX recovery process, since landlords 
were more prepared to resolve issues with larger tenants. One large international 
tenant confirmed that they receive all proposed OPEX and capital improvement 
budgets each year from their landlord and are given the opportunity to discuss and 
debate or include further items. As he explained, “it allows us to have transparency 
over the OPEX, what’s spent, and to have some input into those budgets and control 
them” (Private Tenant 2).  It was also suggested by this interviewee that small 
strategically less important tenants, with less influence, may not be offered this 
opportunity and that this could result in them being more dissatisfied with their OPEX 
payments. 
 
 Landlords and tenants expressed different views on the distinction between the OPEX 
and capital expenses resulting in significantly different opinions regarding which of 
the landlord’s costs should be recovered. The landlords interviewed revealed that they 
did ‘pass through’ a number of expense items which have been identified as non-
recoverable expenses, such as management fees, sinking fund contributions and 
corporate fees (Christiansen, 1988; Hennigh, 2004; Hollyfield, 1994). Even though the 
use of sinking funds in leases is declining within the industry (Eccles and Holt, 2010), 
the majority of landlords had provisions for tenant contribution for sinking funds. The 
landlords’ ability to include such items in the OPEX reflects the bargaining strengths 
of these large-scale landlords and the quality of their building stock located in prime 
locations.   
 
Net lease tenants expressed strong reservations in respect of the payment for certain 
types of expenses which they thought of as ownership related expenses.  These 
included; any contribution to capital expenses, sinking fund contributions, corporate 
fees, ground rent, and management fees. As explained by an international tenant:  
 
“There are a couple of things in net lease that I believe the tenant should not be 
responsible for. Management fees and corporate fees would be an absolute no, no 
as far as I am concerned. Also, there shouldn’t be any place for sinking fund 
contributions because it is not my job to maintain the landlord’s 
investment”(Private Tenant 1).  
 
Overall, the results highlight the differences in perceptions and experiences of the 
OPEX recovery process between landlords and tenants. It is clear that tenants are 
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more dissatisfied with their OPEX responsibilities than landlords perceive they are. 
The main reason for this could be the differences in objectives of landlords and 
tenants in terms of OPEX responsibilities. Landlords try to maximise their net return 
by passing on OPEX to tenants, while tenants try to minimise their occupancy costs 
by avoiding them. These differing objectives can create conflict between the two 
parties from time to time. The interviews strongly suggest that this issue may be more 
significant for those tenants who have less influence or power over the landlord.   
 
Property operation and maintenance (O&M) procedures 
Conflicting opinions were expressed by the landlords interviewed regarding their 
approach to O&M under gross and net leases. Two of the landlords argued that there 
was a potential for under-maintenance of properties under gross leases, as landlords 
would be reluctant to increase the amount of OPEX unless it increases their returns 
substantially. This situation may be more evident when the lease provisions are vague 
and when the tenants are less influential. One landlord stated:      
“I know for a fact that landlords who run gross leased buildings won’t spend 
money where they should and that is a detriment to the level of service the 
tenants get”(Landlord 3).  
 
Three of the landlords interviewed indicated that they paid equal attention to the 
O&M standards of their properties no matter what the lease type. Justifying their 
decision, they explained that poorly maintained premises would have several long-
term negative impacts such as; unnecessary increases in OPEX, lower rents on rent 
reviews and lease renewals, limited tenure choices, highly obsolete buildings, lower 
capital value of buildings, high tenant turnover, less influential power in lease 
negotiations, potential damage to landlord-tenant relationship and inefficiently 
operating buildings. However, even these landlords admitted that spending money on 
gross leased buildings would not be worthwhile if the borrowing costs for the 
investment are higher than the net return from the property.     
 
Interestingly, one landlord indicated that he was inclined to pay more attention to the 
O&M standards of gross leased buildings as any savings made on OPEX would 
increase the net return between rent reviews.  He stated “We pay more attention to the 
gross on the basis that any savings we make on OPEX goes directly on capital which 
adds to the value” (Landlord 5). But he also acknowledged that he tended to be over-
zealous in the care of net leased properties knowing that those costs were recoverable.   
 
Tenants’ attitudes towards the O&M procedures seemed to be influenced by the type 
of occupier. Public sector tenants tended to have a large sphere of influence within 
their local market and thus had the power to ensure that their properties were operated 
and maintained to an acceptable standard. All public sector tenants believed they had 
adequate provisions in their gross leases to prevent the premises from becoming 
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neglected. One interviewee suggested that they would not hesitate to issue notices, or 
take actions, if the landlord showed little or no interest in the care of the property:   
 
“We’ve got enough clout in our lease that if the owner doesn’t perform and we’ve 
given him due notice then we go ahead and do it and charge” (Public Tenant 2). 
 
Among the private sector tenants interviewed, international organisations tended to 
express more concern regarding the quality standards of gross leased buildings than 
the New Zealand tenants. These concerns may reflect their relative unfamiliarity with 
gross leases and their requirement for relatively high quality business environments. 
As explained by an international tenant who had experience in occupying premises on 
both net and gross leases:  
 
“In our net leased buildings we might say ‘we’ve got problems with the AC’, 
someone will be there to fix it straight away and send us the bill. But with gross 
leases you’re constantly trying to get them to do something because they don’t want 
to spend any more money” (Private Tenant 1).  
 
Interestingly the national corporate tenants did not feel that the O&M processes 
associated with a net lease were more effective than the O&M processes of a building 
leased out on a gross basis. Some even suggested that in their opinion no major 
differences existed between the O&M processes under the two lease types.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the nature of the landlord and their management 
philosophy, in conjunction with the tenants’ ability to influence the landlord, the 
length of lease, provisions in leases to prevent premises from being neglected, and 
landlords’ reporting requirements towards tenants, would determine how landlords 
operate and manage properties under alternative leases. From the tenants’ perspective, 
their lease priorities, expectations of the building quality, specialist knowledge and 
expertise in building O&M processes, and their skills in the detection of inefficiencies 
in O&M procedures are some of the main factors affecting their satisfaction levels. 
The results highlight the nature of ongoing power dynamics between the landlord and 
tenant. If the tenant has significant influence over their landlord, it is more likely that 
the landlord will ensure that the tenant’s requirements are well catered for. Tenant 
dissatisfaction may be more likely in the case of tenants who have little or no ability to 
influence the landlord.   
 
The landlord-tenant relationship 
Both landlords and tenants perceived that the landlord-tenant relationship was affected 
by the lease type and this was particularly the case for tenants. Significantly, both 
parties perceived that the strength of the landlord-tenant relationship under gross 
leases tended to be stronger than that of landlords and tenants on net leases. The 
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landlords highlighted the benefit of the ‘simplicity’ associated with gross leases in 
reducing problems with tenants; 
 
“Under net leases you get more questions about the OPEX.  You may tend to have 
better relationships with the tenants under gross leases because you don’t have to 
debate or discuss potential arguments around OPEX”(Landlord 1). 
 
Tenants identified a number of reasons for the differences in relationship strengths 
under gross and net leases as summarised below: 
 
 Gross lease tenants are less likely to have to negotiate on matters relating to 
OPEX thus eliminating the potential for conflict 
 Some net lease tenants believe that they are being overcharged or incorrectly 
charged   
 Visibility and transparency in respect to OPEX under net leases can create 
conflict in the circumstances where the tenant believes that the landlord has 
spent money unnecessarily. 
 
This finding is consistent with the views of Rothenberg and Ruddy (2004) who 
suggest that disputes over OPEX can have a negative impact on the landlord-tenant 
relationship. The analysis of the interviews also indicated that the ‘quality of the 
premises’, ‘covenants of the lease’, ‘landlords’ and  tenants’ willingness to invest in a 
relationship’, ‘extent of trust in the relationship’, and the ‘length of occupancy’ had 
the potential to affect the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. In addition, the 
landlord’s ‘level of responsiveness’, ‘understanding of tenants’ business needs’, 
‘accessibility’ and ‘extent of professionalism in the relationship’ have a significant 
impact on how tenants perceive the relationship.  
 
Despite the lease type, the majority of tenants were frustrated with the difficulties in 
communicating with the landlord. This frustration stemmed from landlords being 
‘slow to respond to requests’, ‘not responding at all’, ‘not following up’, ‘not being 
available to discuss issues’ and ‘not keeping tenants informed about what was 
happening in the building’. This resulted in their viewing the landlord and their 
relationship negatively.  
 
A common view across both landlords and tenants was that landlords tended to have a 
stronger relationship with their large, strategically important, tenants no matter what 
their lease type. All landlords emphasised that they were strongly motivated to 
maintain good relationships with their major tenants, since those tenants were more 
important in terms of revenue generation, long term image of the building and the 
ability to attract further high quality tenants. They clearly indicated that the time and 
attention they were prepared to allocate to tenants would be proportionate to the 
income that particular tenants generated, and thus the strongest and most desirable 
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tenants tended to receive more attention and higher relationship benefits. As one 
interviewee put it, “timewise I am not going to spend as much time with a retailer 
whose rental is $20,000 a year as opposed to someone else whose rental is $2.5 
million”(Landlord 2).   
 
This observation suggests that many large scale landlords are not interested in 
maintaining the same level of relationship with all of their tenants, but will put more 
effort into those tenants paying more rent and those with higher reputations. This was 
emphasised by the majority of landlords who described their relationship with major 
tenants as a ‘business partnership’ and their relationship with strategically less 
important tenants as more ‘adversarial in nature’. As explained by one landlord:    
 
“As they occupy the whole building or a large portion of it we’re in a partnership, 
they’ve got involvements in the decisions we make about the buildings. But in a 
multi-tenant property, if you’re going to do a refurbishment, you just do it; 
whether the tenants like it or not, you don’t have to care” (Landlord 5) 
 
This finding was strongly supported by all of the tenants interviewed who confirmed 
that large scale tenants experienced stronger relationships with their landlords and 
were treated as more valued customers than their smaller counterparts. This resulted in 
landlords giving these larger scale tenants preferential treatment and maintaining 
frequent contact with them in order to provide opportunities to discuss any issues and 
concerns.  
 
These results highlight the significance of on-going power dynamics between 
landlords and tenants. It was apparent that the stronger the relationship and the respect 
the landlord had for the tenant, the greater the potential for tenants to influence the 
operation of a lease. This close relationship may explain why major tenants tend to be 
more satisfied with their accommodation and enjoy certain benefits of scale. Overall, 
landlords tend to adopt differentiated relationship strategies with tenants and are 
partial towards more desirable tenants. Thus, the strategic importance of certain 
tenants in a building can have a significant impact on the nature and level of their 
relationship with the landlord.    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the behaviours, perceptions, experiences and key issues 
confronting landlords and tenants when contracting under alternative lease structures. 
The study focuses on gross and net lease structures in two of New Zealand’s largest 
commercial centres, Auckland and Wellington.  
 
The results highlight that the nature of the lease not only has significant financial 
implications for net returns, but also non-financial outcomes, including the operation 
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and maintenance procedures of the premises, the landlord-tenant relationship, and 
ultimately, overall landlord/tenant satisfaction. All landlords interviewed expressed a 
strong preference for triple net leases which allowed them to recover all the property 
running expenses from tenants. Yet, despite their strong preference for fully 
recoverable net leases, their leasing strategies and behaviours were affected by the 
prevailing dominant lease type operating in sub-markets (e.g. Auckland has net leases 
and Wellington has gross leases). 
 
Major differences between the perceptions, behaviours and experiences of private and 
public sector organisations, as well as international and national corporate tenants, 
were identified. Public sector tenants in general tend to favour gross leases, while the 
international and national corporate tenants favour net leases. Public sector tenants 
indicated that their preference for gross leases was due to their aversion to cost 
uncertainties, together with a potential distrust of a landlord’s management of 
recoverable expenses. On the other hand, large scale corporate tenants tend to be more 
concerned about the quality of their premises, as opposed to their occupancy costs. 
International private sector tenants tended to express a stronger preference for net 
leases than national private sector tenants, which may be a reflection of their 
familiarity with net leases. 
 
The interviews also demonstrated the significance of the balance of power between 
landlords and tenants, and that leasing behaviours, perceptions and experiences were 
affected by on-going power relations. The interviewees clearly articulated how power 
dynamics affected both tenants and landlords and can have a major impact on lease 
negotiation, building O&M procedures and the nature of the landlord-tenant 
relationship. While the interviews confirmed the power of landlords to shape the 
leasing environment it also highlighted the power of key tenants. In contrast to 
accounts that posit a uniform landlord dominated environment, our study reveals a 
more fluid set of power asymmetries. Under certain circumstances, tenants can and do 
exercise considerable influence. In particular, power asymmetries in areas such as the 
size, sphere of influence, specialist knowledge, information availability, leasing 
experience and market conditions, are used by large-scale tenants to influence their 
landlords’ leasing decisions. If a tenant has significant influence over their landlord, it 
is more likely that the landlord will ensure that their requirements are well catered for. 
The landlords tend to be more flexible towards those they classify as important 
tenants, but not necessarily towards those considered to be of less importance.  
 
Given the strong preferences from landlords, and the acceptance from large corporate 
tenants, the interviews indicate that net leases are becoming more commonplace, 
particularly in new lettings. However, the interviews also suggest that both landlords 
and tenants do not expect significant changes in the operation of the New Zealand 
leasing market or their leasing strategies in the near future. In this context, both the 
Auckland and Wellington commercial leasing markets are characterised by persistent 
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path dependencies or institutional inertia. Yet, notwithstanding this inertia, it is clear 
that landlords and tenants are willing to be flexible in lease negotiations and 
management practice. In, particular, it is clear that larger tenants hold considerable 
sway with landlords, whether public bodies demanding gross leases or large 
corporates demanding services. Going forward, the need to manage large tenants will 
alter practices and behaviours in the market. Large tenants and landlords that espouse 
strong environmental and social responsibility agendas will likely promote the rise of 
green leases in the market. In addition, it is likely that successful landlords and tenants 
will increasingly seek to manage the transactional dimensions of their interactions in a 
mutually beneficial way. These trends point toward the need for a more sophisticated 
set of tenant-landlord practices and behaviours that move beyond simple adversarial 
rent setting negotiations, to more of an ongoing partnership.    
 
The current research highlights the value of analysing how key market agents actively 
create, and consequently interact and behave, in different lease environments. The 
analysis offers a context for developing a deeper understanding of the operation of 
alternative lease structures in a national market. By focusing on the behaviour and 
experiences of key market actors, the findings provide useful insights into landlord–
tenant dynamics in New Zealand commercial property markets. Although this 
research focuses on the behaviours and experiences of large scale landlords and 
tenants, anecdotal evidence from informal discussions with the interview participants 
suggests that the behaviours and experiences of small scale landlords and tenants may 
be significantly different. A study addressing the perceptions, behaviours and 
experiences of small, less sophisticated, landlords and tenants under alternative lease 
structures would add another dimension to the findings of this research. 
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